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VOTER BEWARE: COLORADO’S BALLOT 
INITIATIVES AND THE TAKING OF PRIVATE 
PROPERTY UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
DANIEL FRANKLIN* 
Brief Introduction 
In 2013, two municipalities in Colorado enacted moratoria on the use of 
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”)1—a technique that has been used for 
decades to stimulate oil and gas production from new and existing oil and 
gas wells. In addition to the fracking moratoria, various organizations and 
interest groups proposed a number of ballot initiatives relating to local 
regulation of oil and gas in 2014.  
Colorado is one of a few states that allows its residents to amend the 
state constitution by popular vote. In Colorado, if enough signatures are 
collected in support of a ballot initiative, the initiative is placed on the 
ballot and submitted to a vote.2 The oil and gas ballot initiatives proposed, 
among other things, gave local government regulatory authority over oil 
and gas operations in their jurisdictions and increased the statewide setback 
requirements for new wells. If approved, these initiatives would have 
                                                                                                                 
 * Daniel Franklin is a 2016 Graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
He currently works as a Landman for Anadarko Petroleum in Denver, Colorado.  
 1. See Colorado Supreme Court Considers Legality of Fracking Bans, Heartland Inst. 
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2016/02/18/colorado-supreme-
court-considers-legality-fracking-bans. 
 2. See Placing an Initiated Proposal on the Statewide Ballot, Colo. Legislative 
Council, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cga-legislativecouncil/how-file (last visited June 
28, 2016). 
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amended the Colorado Constitution and seized regulatory authority from 
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission.3 
The minimum setback ballot initiatives required new wells to be drilled 
anywhere from 1,500 feet to 2,640 feet from occupied structures, 
representing a substantial increase from the current statewide 500-foot 
setback requirement.4 The “local control” initiatives permitted local 
governments to enact more restrictive regulations on exploration and 
production of oil and gas than those currently enforced by the State and 
would likely result in outright bans on fracking. Both types of ballot 
initiatives would negatively affect the oil and gas sector in Colorado—and 
eliminating the use of fracking would eliminate virtually all economic oil 
and gas development in the state.  
In November of 2014, Governor John Hickenlooper and United States 
Representative Jared Polis agreed to pull the ballot initiatives from the 
November ballot in an attempt to create legislative compromise.5 Polis—
who indicated the initiatives would resurface if he opposed the results of the 
compromise—pulled his support of the initiatives in exchange for an oil 
and gas task force.6 The task force is responsible for minimizing the 
conflicts that occur between concerned citizens and oil and gas companies 
when oil and gas operations are in urban areas surrounding schools and 
homes.  
These ballot initiatives resurfaced in January of 2016.7 The new ballot 
initiatives provide for local regulation of oil and gas activity, an increase of 
mandatory statewide setbacks to 2500 feet, and an outright ban on 
fracking.8 If these initiatives make the ballot and voters approve them, they 
will diminish the value of privately owned mineral rights and mineral leases 
held by oil and gas companies operating in the state. Voters should be 
aware that such measures could give rise to claims by mineral rights owners 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See id.  
 4. See Statement of Basis, Specific Statutory Authority, and Purpose New Rules and 
Amendments to Current Rules of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 2 
CCR 404-1, Cause No. 1R, Docket No. 1211-RM-04 Setbacks (Retrieved from 
https://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_HF2012/setbacks/FinalRules/Final_SetbackRules-
StatementOfBasisAndPurpose.pdf). 
 5. See Mark Jaffe, Hickenlooper Compromise Keeps Oil and Gas Measures off 
Colorado Ballot, Denver Post (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26274685/hickenlooper-polis-float-colorado-oil-
gas-local-control. 
 6. Id.  
 7. See Colorado 2016 Ballot Measures, Ballotpedia, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_2016_ballot_measures (last visited June 28, 2016). 
 8. Id.  
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and oil and gas operators under the “takings clause” of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Such claims could result in cities, 
counties and the State being liable for billions of dollars in damages, and at 
the very least, years of costly litigation. 
Overview of the Takings Clause 
The last clause of the Fifth Amendment—which applies to state 
governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment9—
says, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”10 When either federal or state governments appropriate 
private property for the benefit of the public, the takings clause requires 
them to justly compensate property owners. There is no language in the 
takings clause that excludes the clause from applying to oil and gas mineral 
interest. On the contrary, “private property” is a broad concept and 
undoubtedly covers mineral interests and other property rights in realty. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that it has not provided 
clear-cut guidelines for determining when a taking occurs,11 so determining 
whether government action amounts to a taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment is often an uncertain process. The most rudimentary form of 
taking occurs when the government physically intrudes upon or 
permanently occupies private property for the benefit of the public.12 But, 
not all takings claims involve the physical seizing of private property.  
Regulatory Takings: Total and Partial Economic Loss  
Fracking bans and minimum setback requirements do not physically 
deprive mineral rights owners or oil and gas companies of property. Rather, 
the proposed ballot initiatives will severely limit the use of private property 
under the guise of a public benefit. These initiatives, therefore, fall into a 
second category of taking known as a “regulatory taking.” 
Regulatory takings can occur in two ways. A Lucas taking occurs when 
laws or regulations deny property owners of economically viable use of 
property—rather than a physical taking of property.13 Jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                 
 9.  Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).  
 10. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 11. See, eg., Connolly v. PBGC, 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 12. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.  
 13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). See also Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
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suggests that regulations are not takings unless there is a substantial—
nearly complete—loss of economic value of the property.14 Under Penn 
Central, if a regulation places economic limitations on property but does 
not eliminate all economically beneficial use, the regulation still may be a 
taking.15 This depends on a variety of factors, such as the extent to which 
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment backed expectations.16 
If a court finds that regulatory interference goes too far, the property owner 
will be compensated.17  
Obviously, not all laws that reduce property value give rise to a taking. 
The general rule is that property may be regulated to a certain extent, but if 
the regulation goes too far—based on a factual inquiry—it will amount to a 
taking.18  
Lucas Taking: Total Economic Loss  
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a law that resulted in complete diminution of David 
Lucas’s property value resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In 
the case, Lucas purchased two coastal lots in South Carolina.19 Thereafter, 
the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act, 
which prohibited Lucas from constructing any habitable structure on his 
property.20  
Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas against 
the South Carolina Coastal Council, the regulatory agency responsible for 
implementing South Carolina’s coastal zoning laws.21 Lucas claimed that 
the statute’s application to him was a Fifth Amendment taking, and that he 
was therefore entitled to just compensation.22 The trial court agreed with 
Lucas because the statute rendered Lucas’s property interest “valueless” 
and ordered the state to pay Lucas a substantial judgment.23 The South 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that the Beachfront 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Jafay v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 848 P.2d 892, 901 (Colo. 1993)(en banc). 
 15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25. 
 16. Id. at 124.  
 17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006. 
 20. Id. at 1007. 
 21. Id. at 1009.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id.  
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Management Act’s objective of preventing public harm as a result of beach 
erosion was within the nuisance exception to takings clause liability.24 
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the nuisance theory used by the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina, stating that “it becomes self-evident 
noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory 
‘takings’—which require compensation—from regulatory deprivations that 
do not require compensation.”25 The Court further stated that “the 
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for 
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be 
compensated.”26 The court ultimately solidified a rule requiring payment 
for regulations that deny property owners all economically beneficial use of 
their property for the benefit of the public27 and remanded the case to the 
South Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether the Beachfront 
Management Act constituted a taking of Lucas’s property by completely 
extinguishing Lucas’ ability to realize any beneficial economic use from the 
property.28 
Colorado may be exposed to a Lucas claim if the public enacts the ballot 
initiatives. The Supreme Court’s Lucas decision requires compensation 
when a regulation deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial 
use of his or her property.29 If sued, the state would likely argue that no 
Lucas taking has occurred since fracking bans do not impede a company’s 
ability to drill conventional vertical wells on their leasehold. Any 
diminution in value, therefore, is not a loss of all economically beneficial 
use of the property as required by Lucas. Landowners, however, will argue 
that outright fracking bans destroy all economic value of their mineral 
rights because fracking is the only available method to recover oil and gas 
in economic quantities. Oil and gas companies—who can only derive 
economic gain from the production of oil and gas—might also argue that 
fracking bans create a total loss of the economic value of their leases 
because conventional drilling cannot produce hydrocarbons in paying 
quantities. If these points prove true, a ban on fracking likely constitutes a 
taking and it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment to disproportionately 
burden a few private citizens—instead of the public as a whole—with the 
cost of governmental action intended to benefit the public.  
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. at 1009-10. 
 25. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1015-17.  
 28. Id. at 1031-32. 
 29. Id. at 1016.  
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The State will likely counter this argument with the parcel-as-a-whole 
rule. When evaluating the merits of a takings claim, courts generally do not 
divide a parcel of land into separate distinct property rights to determine if a 
property owner has been deprived of economical use of a particular piece or 
segment of ownership.30 Rather, when determining whether a government 
action is a taking, courts focus on the extent of the interference with rights 
in the parcel as a whole instead of viewing the individual property right 
being limited.31 A regulation that eliminates one “strand” in an entire 
bundle of property rights may not be a taking if the owner can still put the 
land to other economically beneficial uses.  
For example, a mineral rights owner would face an obstacle in a takings 
claim against a municipality that bans fracking. The city could argue that 
the ban only affects one piece of the entire bundle of property rights—the 
subsurface mineral rights. The surface owner retains its economically viable 
use for housing or agriculture. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressed concern with the 
logic of the parcel-as-a-whole rule.32 Moreover, several courts have held 
that mineral rights are distinct parcels for takings purposes if the mineral 
owner acquired those rights separately from other property interests.33 This 
is usually the case in Colorado, where mineral rights in oil and gas are 
typically “severed” and acquired separately from surface ownership. 
In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, Whitney Benefits and Peter 
Kiewit Sons' Co. (“Whitney Benefits”) owned coal-bearing property in 
Sheridan County, Wyoming.34 In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”), which Whitney Benefits 
claimed amounted to a taking of their property35 because the SMCRA 
prohibited surface coal mining on their property.36  
In the case, Whitney Benefits applied for a strip mining application with 
the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality,37 which was 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; See also, Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-
31.  
 31. Id.  
 32. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17, (Footnote 7). 
 33. State ex rel. Shelly Materials Inc., v. Clark Cnty. Bd. Of Commr’s., 115 Ohio St.3d 
337, 344 (2007); See also Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (Fed. Cl. 
2002) (distinguishing severed coal rights from unsevered coal rights when performing a 
regulatory takings analysis). 
 34. 752 F.2d 1554, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
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subsequently denied.38 Whitney Benefits promptly filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Wyoming.39 The principal issue in 
the case was whether the Claims Court correctly concluded that SMCRA's 
“prohibition of surface mining of alluvial valley floors was a taking of the 
Whitney Benefits coal property.”40 
After several years of costly litigation, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of sixty 
million dollars to the plaintiffs.41 The court of appeals held that the 
prohibition of mining in a particular tract of land—where the only property 
interest the plaintiff owned in the tract was the right to surface mining—
was a total taking because the regulation wholly destroyed the economic 
value of the plaintiff’s property without just compensation.42  
The aforementioned cases support “total takings” claims by mineral 
rights owners and oil and gas companies if the proposed ballot initiatives 
result in fracking bans or moratoria. Total takings claims based on 
increased setback requirements may be more difficult. If setbacks are 
increased it will still be possible to drill in some cases, even though the 
number of wells on the mineral leasehold may be significantly reduced. 
Because it may still be possible to drill, the increased setback may not 
effectuate a total taking of the economic value of a mineral interest or oil 
and gas lease. Additionally, because of the parcel-as-a-whole rule, it may be 
an uphill fight for landowners to prevail under the total takings analysis if 
they own the entire parcel, including the un-severed mineral rights, because 
increased setbacks would not affect their ability to utilize the parcel for 
other economic ventures. But, in light of the Supreme Court’s contempt for 
the parcel-as-a-whole rule and cases like Whitney Benefits that require just 
compensation for regulations that destroy the economic value of mineral 
estates, landowners and oil and gas operators have strong arguments for 
Lucas claims. 
Partial Regulatory Takings 
If a claim is unsuccessful as a total taking under Lucas, mineral rights 
owners and oil and gas companies may still have “partial” takings claims if 
the regulation “goes too far.” Whether a partial taking has occurred depends 
mostly on specific circumstances in a particular case. After Penn Central 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 1156.  
 40. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 41. See id. at 1178. 
 42. Id. at 1177. 
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Transportation Company v. City of New York, courts generally balance the 
economic impact of the regulation, the regulation’s interference with 
investment-backed expectation, and the character of the governmental 
action.43  
In Penn Central, the Court noted that Grand Central Terminal “is one of 
New York City’s most famous buildings. Opened in 1913, it is regarded not 
only as providing an ingenious engineering solution to the problems 
presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent example of 
the French beaux-arts style.”44 In 1967, the New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission, after a public hearing on the issue, designated 
the terminal as a landmark.45 This meant that any alterations to the 
building’s exterior or architectural features would require Commission 
approval.46 
In 1968, in an effort to generate supplemental income, Penn Central 
entered into a fifty-year lease and sub-lease agreement for the construction 
of either a fifty-five-story office building above the terminal or a fifty-
three-story office building that would require some alterations to the 
terminal.47 Both parties agreed that the building would meet all zoning and 
safety requirements not connected with historic preservation.48 Despite this 
fact, the Commission elected to preserve the terminal and its landmark 
status and rejected Penn Central’s application on the grounds that both 
plans were an “aesthetic joke.”49 
Penn Central filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York arguing that 
the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to them appropriated their 
property without “just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”50 The New York Supreme Court agreed and granted 
declaratory and injunctive relief to Penn Central.51 On appeal, the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed.52 The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered three factors when 
determining whether the governmental action constituted a taking: (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation’s interference with 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.  
 44. Id. at 115. 
 45. Id. at 115.  
 46. See id. at 117. 
 47. Id. at 116-17.  
 48. Id. at 115-18. 
 49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 117-18. 
 50. Id. at 119. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
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investment-backed expectation; (3) and the character of the governmental 
action.53 The Court ultimately concluded that the application of New York 
City’s Landmark Preservation Laws had not effectuated a taking of private 
property because in equipoise, the character of the governmental action—
promotion of the general welfare and promoting reasonable beneficial use 
of the landmark—outweighed the interference with investment-backed 
expectation and the economic impact of the law.54 
The Penn Central factors are vague and often lead to an ad hoc factual 
inquiry. It is clear, however, that a decrease in property value, by itself, 
generally is not enough to amount to a taking.55 But, oil and gas operators 
and mineral rights owners can make strong arguments that the initiatives 
constitute takings. 
Mineral rights owners can claim that bans and moratoria on fracking and 
radical increases in statewide setbacks destroy the investment expectations 
in their property. Oil and gas operators—who have spent billions 
purchasing mineral leases and building infrastructure expecting to earn a 
return on their investment—would find that the number of wells they can 
drill is greatly reduced. When courts consider the loss of investment 
expectation in conjunction with the decrease in value of the mineral estates 
as a result of the increased setbacks, it seems clear that the proposed 
regulation constitutes a taking.  
Conclusion 
When a court decides that government action amounts to a taking, the 
court declares that the general public, rather than a single citizen or small 
group of citizens, should bear the burden of an exercise of governmental 
power intended to benefit the public. No set formula exists for weighing 
these private and public interests. If Colorado voters approve the proposed 
ballot initiatives on fracking or increased setbacks, mineral rights owners 
and oil and gas companies operating in the State will have legitimate 
federal constitutional claims requiring compensation for the taking of their 
property. Voters should be aware that if those claims are successful, the 
resulting billions of dollars in damages could bankrupt local governments 
and the State. 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 124.  
 54. See id. at 138.  
 55. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs., 38 P.3d 59, 65 (Colo. 
2001). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
98 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 2 
  
But, in addition to the cost of the lawsuit and the potential liability for 
state and local governments, voters should consider the economic impact 
and budgetary problems that these initiatives may cause. 
 A statewide fracking ban would prove damaging to the 
Colorado economy, setting the state back an average of 68,000 
jobs in the first five years and $8 billion in GDP. Over the long 
term (2015-2040), the impact of a ban would result in average 
93,000 fewer jobs and $12 billion in lower GDP when compared 
to a baseline scenario.56 
The resulting reduction in GDP and taxable income will likely exacerbate 
Colorado’s burgeoning budgetary deficit.  
The anti-fracking and increased setback initiatives offer little (if any) 
benefit to Coloradans and are fiscally irresponsible. When voters set aside 
the political factors surrounding these ballot initiatives, it is clear that these 
initiatives will fiscally harm Colorado if passed—even if state and local 
governments were to escape takings liability. The only way for state and 
local governments to win this zero sum game is to not play. Voter beware. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 56. Richard Wobbekind & Brian Lewandowski, Hydraulic Fracturing Ban: The 
Economic Impact of a Statewide Fracking Ban in Colorado, at 17 (Cindy DiPersio ed., 
2014). 
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